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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2017 North Dakota made a seemingly minor modification to 
its voter ID law that required any valid identification to list a residential address.1 
Despite its benign appearance on paper, the residential address requirement 
disproportionately impacted thousands of tribal members living on reservations 
because they used P.O. boxes instead of physical addresses.2 It is likely not a 
coincidence that the Republican-dominated state government imposed a targeted 
address requirement on the eve of the 2018 midterm elections where North Dakota 
senator Heidi Heitkamp, the state’s lone Democratic senator, was facing a hotly 
contested re-election battle.3 Heitkamp had been elected in 2012 by a narrow 
margin of several thousand votes, largely attributed to tribal voters.4 Perhaps 
because of the gravity of the race—Heitkamp was one of the most vulnerable 
Democratic senators in an election cycle that could have flipped the senate to the 
 
 Special thanks to Laura Lamatia, Cookie Allan, Julie Kane, and Prof. Benjamin Cover for their ٭
insight and support.  
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-04.1 (2017) (enacted as H.B. 1369 on April 25, 2017). 
2. Vincent Schilling, In Wake of New Voter ID Law: Mad Rush to Repair Native Voting Woes in 
N. Dakota, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 15, 2018), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/in-
wake-of-new-voter-id-law-mad-rush-to-repair-native-voting-woes-in-n-dakota-OE6zHfTozku1PP-
w16esWQ/. 
3. Maggie Astor, In North Dakota, Native Americans Try to Turn an ID Law to Their Advantage, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/us/politics/north-dakota-voter-
id.html. 
4. Id.  
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Democrats—this voter suppression effort, and the tribes’ powerful resistance to it, 
garnered national media attention.5 
However, the North Dakota Legislature’s disdain for Native voting rights is not 
an isolated phenomenon and state governments around the country have erected 
barriers to the franchise.6 Many of these restrictions exploit the often remote and 
rural nature of reservations, requiring tribal members to supply residential 
addresses that may not exist, moving polling places off reservations and so 
necessitating hours-long drives to vote, and restricting access to early and absentee 
voting. Indeed, Idaho is no stranger to restricting the Native vote as its original state 
constitution prohibited “Indians . . . who have not severed their tribal relations and 
adopted the habits of civilization” to vote, serve as jurors, or hold public office.7 
This restriction on tribal members voting was not lifted until a constitutional 
amendment in 1950.8 And, as recently as the 1980s, redistricting efforts in Idaho 
have targeted on-reservation tribal communities.9  
Using the framework for an “opt-in” approach to the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) 
proposed by Professor Heather Gerken,10 this paper argues that the VRA should be 
amended to allow tribal governments to opt-in to Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
review of state and local laws that infringe on tribal members’ voting rights. This 
approach would not only directly address the problems of Native voter suppression 
but would also be consistent with the federal government’s trust responsibilities 
and national policy goal of tribal self-determination.  
First, this paper gives an overview of the mechanics of the opt-in approach 
and the scholarly criticisms of its limitations including the difficulty in identifying 
the appropriate body to represent minority interests under the approach.  
Next, this paper argues that tribal governments are uniquely situated to 
effectively deploy the opt-in approach to the VRA because they have the sovereign 
authority to represent the interests of tribal members. Indeed, the opt-in approach 
would also serve the federal government’s trust responsibilities to the tribes and 
advance the federal policy of tribal self-determination. 
II. THE OPT-IN APPROACH 
During the run-up to the 2006 reauthorization of section 5 of the VRA both 
legislators and the academic community fractured over how, or if, section 5 should 
 
5. See, e.g., Id.; Schilling, supra note 2; Camila Domonoske, Many Native IDs Won’t be Accepted 
at North Dakota Polling Places, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 13, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/13/657125819/many-native-ids-wont-be-accepted-at-north-dakota-
polling-places. 
6. E.g., Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1162 (D. Utah 2016) (holding that a 
county redistricting decision packing Native voters into one district was unconstitutional under the equal 
protection clause); Wandering Medicine v. McCulloch, 906 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Mont. 2012) (challenge 
to lack of satellite offices on reservation to provide voter registration and in-person absentee voting); 
Toyukak v. Mallott, No. 3:13-CV-00137-SLG, 2015 WL 11120474 (D. Alaska Sept. 30, 2015) (ordering state 
of Alaska to provide election materials in native languages).  
7. IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (repealed 1950).  
8. Idaho Constitutional Amendment History, IDAHO SECRETARY ST. ELECTION DIVISION, 
https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/hst40_50.htm (last visited June 1, 2020). 
9. See, e.g., Hellar v. Cenarussa, 664 P.2d 765, 104 Idaho 858 (1983).  
10. See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-in 
Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV 708 (2006).  
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be reauthorized.11 Section 5 of the VRA, one of the most successful pieces of civil 
rights law ever enacted, was intended to frustrate southern intransigence by 
subjecting certain covered jurisdictions to preclearance requirements for electoral 
changes.12 By requiring southern states to preclear proposed election changes, 
federal regulators were able to stay one step ahead of jurisdictions intent on finding 
new, creative ways to disenfranchise minority voters. Imposing preclearance 
requirements under section 5 of the VRA hinged on application of a formula to 
determine which jurisdictions were covered.13  
The original coverage formula in section 4(b) of the VRA required preclearance 
for election changes in any jurisdiction that had maintained a voting test or device 
as of November 1, 1964, and in which less than 50 percent of voters were registered 
or turned out for the 1964 presidential election.14 Congress felt that this 
combination of factors served as a useful proxy for jurisdictions that may be 
discriminating against minority voters.15 As originally enacted, Congress 
determined that seven states—Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, and Virginia—as well as 37 counties would be subject to 
preclearance.16 The preclearance regime, as enacted in 1965, was set to practically 
expire within five years.17 Congress extended the preclearance requirements in 
1970, 1975, and 1982.18 All of the reauthorizations of the VRA tethered their 
extensions to election data from the relevant time period, but the 1982 Congress 
 
11. See, e.g., Jocelyn Benson, Preparing for 2007: Legal and Legislative Issues Surrounding 
Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 125 (2004) (discussing legislative 
and scholarly disputes in the run-up to section 5 reauthorization). Also see James Thomas Tucker, The 
Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205 (2007) 
for an interesting retrospective on how the legislative sausage was made during the reauthorization 
process.  
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4(b), 5, 79 Stat. 437, 438–39.  
13. E.g. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537 (2013).  
14. Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 12, § 4(b).  
15. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2444–45. 
16. Id. Interestingly enough, although the original VRA makes no explicit reference to Native 
voters, one of the first covered counties was Apache County, Arizona, which is almost two-thirds tribal 
reservation lands of the Navajo Nation, Zunni Reservation, and White Mountain Apache Reservation. 
APACHE CTY. PLANNING & ZONING DEP’T, APACHE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 7 (2004). As of 2018 an 
estimated 74.9 % of the Apache County population is indigenous. Quick Facts: Apache County, Arizona, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/apachecountyarizona/RHI325218#RHI325218 (last 
visited June 1, 2020). 
17. See § 4, 79 Stat. at 438–39. While the sunset provision in section 4 was not express, the 
function of the act itself would prevent further enforcement after five years had elapsed from the date 
of enactment. See id.  
18. Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 4, 84 Stat. 314, 315; Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 101, 201, 89 Stat. 400, 400-01; Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(8), 96 Stat. 131, 133.  
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departed from this trend and inserted an explicit sunset clause calling for expiration 
after twenty-five years without updating the formula.19  
While it is impossible to know just what the 97th Congress was thinking in 
1982 when it kicked the VRA reauthorization can down the road, it is not difficult 
to judge that when that can came tumbling into the 109th Congress it was filled 
with partisan dynamite. Historically speaking, the 109th Congress was one of the 
most bitterly divided congresses, so legislators understandably approached 
reauthorization of the VRA with caution.20 Symbolically, Republican legislators who 
controlled the House did not want to be remembered for dismantling one of the 
most successful civil rights statutes of all time.21 Yet, division among Republicans, 
many of whom believed the strong voter protections of the VRA disproportionately 
benefited Democrats, threatened to derail the reauthorization process.22 Keeping 
with the partisan times, the issue of VRA reauthorization became a binary one: 
either reauthorize with few changes or let it expire.23 
With this partisan battle as a backdrop, Prof. Heather Gerken suggested a 
“third way” for VRA reauthorization.24 Prof. Gerken’s suggestion, which she calls 
the “opt-in approach,” was designed to be a middle ground between letting section 
5 expire and reauthorizing it without amendment.25 Relying on well-established 
administrative law concepts, the goal of the opt-in approach is to create a 
nationwide regulatory apparatus that is not unduly burdensome to either the DOJ 
or state and local governments and put the power in the hands of minority 
communities to determine which laws are worth investigation.26 
The framework of the opt-in approach is relatively straightforward. First, it 
would require sunshine provisions for state and local election changes akin to 
notice and comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act 
(“APA”).27 Covered jurisdictions28 would need to publish proposed election changes 
and open them for comment for a set time period before they could become 
effective.29 Minority groups could then use the comment process as a tool for 
 
19. See § 2(b)(8), 96 Stat. 131, 133.  
20. See Clio Andris et. al, The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, PLOS ONE 10(4) (2015), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0123507; see generally 
Tucker, supra note 11.  
21. See Benson, supra note 11, at 146–48 (discussing the symbolic issues bound up in the 
reauthorizations process). 
22. Tucker, supra note 11, at 207; see also Peter Wallsten and Johanna Neuman, Voting Rights 
Act Renewal Divides GOP, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-
xpm-2006-jul-12-na-voting12-story.html.  
23. See Gerken, supra note 10, at 709. 
24. Id.  
25. Id.  
26. Heather Gerken, Opting into the Voting Rights Act, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/30/opting-into-the-voting-rights-act/.  
27. Gerken, supra note 10, at 717.  
28. Since an opt-in approach would involve nationwide regulation, “covered jurisdiction” is a 
descriptive term that refers the types of governmental bodies covered (e.g. state and county 
governments) and not particular jurisdictions that satisfy a formula like the term is used in section 4 of 
the VRA.  
29. Gerken, supra note 10, at 717; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2018) (requiring agencies to publish 
notice of a proposed rule and accept comments on that rule no later than thirty days before its effective 
date).  
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negotiating with governmental bodies over the proposed election changes and 
suggesting reasonable alternatives.30  
However, unlike the APA, where notice and comment is sometimes cynically 
viewed as a record-building process instead of a meaningful search for public 
input,31 opt-in would give minority organizations a powerful tool to compel 
meaningful negotiations.32 Specifically, the second part of the opt-in approach 
would involve creating a mechanism for minority groups impacted by a proposed 
election change to invoke the investigation and enforcement powers of the DOJ 
under the VRA.33 This could be a simple one-page civil rights complaint submitted 
to the DOJ by a representative of an impacted minority group after the negotiation 
process with state or local government breaks down.34 Once submitted, the 
proposed change would be stayed pending DOJ review and the DOJ would be able 
to utilize the full range of remedies currently available to it under the VRA.35 This 
approach would allow the DOJ to review proposed changes both large and small 
from redistricting plans to isolated changes to polling places or office closures.  
Importantly, the third element of the opt-in approach would be a judicial 
review provision for DOJ decisions approving proposed changes, permitting 
minority groups to “police the policer[s].”36 This provision would place the DOJ on 
the same footing as other agencies with respect to reviewability of their decisions 
in the VRA context, which would likely be increasingly important given how 
partisanship can infect DOJ enforcement of the VRA.37 
Finally, a statutory authorization of the opt-in approach could also give the 
DOJ the authority to promulgate regulations for “safe harbors.” Under a safe harbor 
regulation, the DOJ could outline certain procedures which, if maintained by state 
or local government with respect to proposed election changes, would give the 
covered jurisdiction a presumption of validity.38 On the state-wide level, an example 
of a safe harbor could be an independent redistricting commission, use of which 
would entitle a state to a presumption of validity with respect to districting plans.39 
Similarly, states could set up independent commissions for any number of proposed 
election issues which the DOJ may recognize under a safe harbor regulation.  
 
30. Gerken, supra note 10, at 717.  
31. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992) (“Notice-and-
comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions-a highly 
stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in 
other venues.”). 
32. Gerken, supra note 26.  
33. Gerken, supra note 10, at 717.  
34. Id. at 717–18. 
35. Id. at 718. 
36. Id.  
37. Id.; see generally Ellen D. Katz, Democrats at DOJ: Why Partisan Use of the Voting Rights Act 
Might Not Be So Bad After All, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 415 (2012). 
38. Gerken, supra note 10, at 729. 
39. Id. at 735–36.  
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The benefits of an opt-in approach are legion. For instance, the opt-in 
approach would benefit minority groups, state and local governments, and the DOJ 
in terms of cost and efficiency. After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby County v. 
Holder40 eviscerated the VRA’s preclearance regime, minority groups must now 
engage in expensive and time-consuming section 2 litigation to challenge 
discriminatory election changes.41 For large changes, like redistricting, such 
litigation is routine, but the logistics and expenses of section 2 litigation would likely 
be impracticable for small changes like moving polling places.42 Allowing for groups 
to opt-in to DOJ review of small changes with a one page complaint would save 
immeasurable amounts of time and money for minority groups seeking to protect 
their voting rights.  
Similarly, an opt-in approach would benefit the DOJ because it would only 
need to review the election changes that minority groups themselves would like to 
challenge instead of having to look through a haystack of thousands of proposed 
changes to find a needle of discrimination.43 Before Shelby County, the DOJ was 
reviewing between 14,000 and 20,000 proposed election changes per year.44 
Switching to an opt-in approach would likely dramatically decrease the amount of 
changes the DOJ needs to review and also allow it to only review changes that 
minority groups believe impact their interests.45  
Finally, a corollary of less DOJ review would be a benefit to state and local 
governments needing to wage fewer and less costly battles over proposed election 
changes. The goal of the opt-in approach is to avoid DOJ review by incentivizing 
state and local negotiation with minority communities.46 Presumably not every 
proposed election change would be protested by minority groups, and some may 
avoid challenges through a successful negotiation process. As a result, only a 
fraction of proposed changes would need to be stayed and reviewed by the DOJ. 
Furthermore, the costs of defending against a section 2 challenge under the VRA 
can be immense for local governments.47 It is routine for governments to spend in 
the six or seven figure range to defend against a section 2 claim, while the average 
cost to file the paperwork necessary for preclearance review before Shelby County 
 
40. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Shelby County ruled that section 4 of the VRA was 
no longer constitutional because the formula-imposed burdens on jurisdictions that were not justified 
by data about “current needs.” Id. at 550–51. While not explicitly ruling section 5 unconstitutional, the 
holding in Shelby County effectively rendered section 5 a ship without a sail. 
41. See, e.g., Kiefer Cox, The Voting Rights Act Under Review: Shelby County v. Holder and the 
Consequences of Change, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 493, 509–10 (2014).  
42. Shane Grannum, A Path Forward for Our Representative Democracy: State Independent 
Preclearance Commissions and the Future of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County v. Holder, 10 
GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 95, 111–12 (2018); see also NAACP LDF, COST (IN TIME, MONEY, AND 
BURDEN) OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION, https://perma.cc/6TPN-E7HH (last visited June 
1, 2020). 
43. See Gerken, supra note 26.  
44. About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-
section-5-voting-rights-act (last updated Dec. 4, 2017).  
45. See Gerken, supra note 26. 
46. Id. 
47. See NAACP LDF, supra note 42. 
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was $500.48 Ultimately, given the state of VRA litigation in a post Shelby County 
world, an opt-in system would not only be a cost saving measure for minority 
groups and the DOJ, but also for covered jurisdictions.  
Furthermore, an opt-in approach would satisfy the most pressing 
constitutional concerns raised in Shelby County while simultaneously preserving the 
robust and efficient minority voter protections under preclearance.  A central 
concern of the Shelby County court was that section 4 of the VRA singled out specific 
jurisdictions for preclearance review.49 Such a radical departure from the principle 
of equal state sovereignty would need to be “justified by current needs.”50 Yet, 
since the coverage formula in section 4 of the VRA had not been updated since the 
1970s, it no longer justified the current burdens of preclearance.51  
Opt-in, however, avoids the Court’s constitutional concerns in Shelby County 
two ways. First, the opt-in approach would apply a nationwide regulatory scheme,52 
alleviating constitutional concerns that targeted preclearance violates principles of 
equal sovereignty between the states. Second, the opt-in approach does not hang 
an albatross around the neck of covered jurisdictions for their past discrimination. 
Instead, opt-in is focused on present bad actors, satisfying the Court’s current 
burdens/current needs paradigm. Quite literally, the current burden of 
preclearance under an opt-in approach would be based exclusively on the current 
needs of minority groups in the jurisdiction.  
Despite its numerous advantages, the opt-in approach also has significant 
flaws. For example, the greatest weakness of the approach is determining which 
organizations or people can speak for minority communities impacted by a 
proposed election change. Although the simplicity and the advantages of the opt-
in approach are compelling, the practical reality of choosing which group or groups 
get to have a voice in the process is messy at best.53 Scholars like Jason Rathod have 
critiqued Prof. Gerken’s opt-in approach because it could result in “a troubling 
entrenchment” of racial balkanization as well as ceding “incredible bargaining 
power” to unaccountable members of civil rights organizations.54 One of the most 
troubling aspects of the opt-in system as proposed by Prof. Gerken is the state 
 
48. NAACP LDF, supra note 42. For instance, in Georgia the Fayette County Board of 
Commissioners and Board of Education spent $1.11 million defending the county’s at-large voting 
system from a section 2 challenge, in South Carolina Charleston County spent $2 million defending 
against a section 2 claim, and in Washington the city of Yakima spent almost $3 million in defense and 
attorney’s fees associated with a section 2 challenge. Id. This is not to mention the enormous costs in 
time and money spent litigating state-wide election changes like redistricting and voter ID laws.   
49. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542 (2013). 
50. Id. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
51. Id. at 557.  
52. Gerken, supra note 26. 
53. See Gerken, supra note 10, at 741–42. 
54. Jason Rathod, A Post-Racial Voting Rights Act, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 139, 212–13 
(2011).  
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authorization of “select individuals acting as though they speak for the ‘African-
American’ or ‘Latino-American’ community.”55 Finally, although the intent of the 
opt-in approach is to foster more collaboration between covered jurisdictions and 
minority groups, using the DOJ as a “Sword of Damocles” is an unlikely way to 
reduce animosity or resentment from local election officials.56 
In sum, opt-in can be an enticing approach to all impacted parties. Adopting 
opt-in would preserve federal resources, keep in place strong protections for 
minority voters, incentivize community representation, and save resources in 
covered jurisdictions. However, the approach has significant concerns, especially 
with issues of minority representation. In the following section, this paper argues 
that adopting the opt-in approach for tribal governments would best address the 
most prevalent forms of voter discrimination facing tribal members, preserve the 
advantages of the opt-in system, and evade the serious representational concerns 
of opt-in. 
III. OPT-IN FOR TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 
Indian Country is no stranger to voter suppression, discrimination, and 
disenfranchisement. Well into the twentieth century, many states, including Idaho, 
expressly disenfranchised Native voters through statutory and constitutional 
provisions.57 Utah, the last jurisdiction in the country to expressly disenfranchise 
Native voters, did not allow Native suffrage until 1957, and only under pressure 
from an impending Supreme Court case.58 Long after formal disenfranchisement 
ended, however, state and local governments around the country continue to 
suppress the Native vote in a variety of ways.59  
While tribal communities frequently get bound up in high-profile election 
issues like redistricting,60 state and local governments often suppress Native voters 
with smaller more insidious changes that target the rural and remote nature of 
many reservations. For instance, state and local laws have suppressed Native voters 
 
55. Id. at 212.  
56. Id. at 213.  
57. Peter Dunphy, The State of Native American Voting Rights, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 13, 
2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/state-native-american-voting-
rights. 
58. Allen v. Merrell, 353 U.S. 932 (1957) (vacating as moot a challenge to Utah’s statute which 
denied Native Americans living on reservations the right to vote because the Utah legislature removed 
the restriction).  
59. See Case Studies, FOUR DIRECTIONS, http://www.fourdirectionsvote.com/case-studies/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020), for examples of recent efforts to restrict tribal members voting and advocacy 
efforts aimed at stopping Native voter suppression.  
60. See, e.g., Hellar v. Cenarussa, 664 P.2d 765, 766, 104 Idaho 858, 859 (1983) (challenging, 
among other things, an Idaho state redistricting plan that split the Coeur d’Alene Reservation into four 
separate districts); Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty., 929 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2019) (challenging a Utah 
plan for county commissioner and school board districts which packed Native voters predominately into 
one district); Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2006) (challenging a South Dakota state 
legislative redistricting plan that packed Native voters into two districts); Frank v. Forest Cty., 336 F.3d 
570 (7th Cir. 2003) (challenging a Wisconsin county’s redistricting plan for county commissioner districts 
because its districts deviated in population up to 18%, disadvantaging Native voters).  
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through the refusal to open satellite election offices,61 closing polling places on 
reservations,62 and requiring residential addresses for voter identification.63 In 
response to this crisis in Native voter suppression, this paper argues that the VRA 
should be amended to grant federally recognized tribes the right to opt-in to DOJ 
review of proposed election changes in their jurisdiction that impact tribal 
members. Adopting an opt-in approach for tribal governments would be a sound 
choice because it would avoid the representational pitfalls of a generalized opt-in,64 
be consistent with the federal government’s trust responsibility, and advance the 
national policy of tribal self-determination. 
 
A. Tribal governments are sovereign entities, accountable to their members, and 
capable of representing tribal interests in an opt-in system. 
As noted above, one of the most powerful critiques of the opt-in approach is 
the difficulty, both logistically and philosophically, of determining which groups are 
capable of speaking for minority interests.65 Under a generalist opt-in approach, 
either Congress or the DOJ would be in the unenviable and untenable position of 
picking and choosing which minority groups would have the authority to file a civil 
rights complaint under the statute. Or, if any group could file a complaint under an 
opt-in approach, the DOJ may also find itself in the tricky position of having to sort 
out contradictory or conflicting complaints filed by separate organizations 
purporting to represent the same minority group. This is a troubling scenario 
because it would place the DOJ in the position of deciding which groups get political 
power rather than merely judging the electoral process itself.66 Indeed, as 
mentioned above, vesting discretion in the DOJ to pick and choose which groups 
are given greater weight in the complaint process under an opt-in approach is also 
concerning because the partisan lean of a particular administration could have 
profound effects on how the DOJ exercises this discretion from election cycle to 
election cycle.67 
 
61. Wandering Medicine v. McCulloch, 906 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Mont. 2012) (failed to open 
satellite offices forced Tribal members to drive more than 100 miles to cast early ballots or register to 
vote late). 
62. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cty., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (D. Utah 2017) 
(county switched to a mail-in only ballot system, closing every county polling place on the Navajo 
Nation). 
63. Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-CV-008, 2016 WL 7118548 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016) (change in state 
law requiring a residential address on qualifying ID disqualified thousands of Tribal members from voting 
where Tribal members used P.O. boxes).  
64. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 45–48. 
66. See Heather K. Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1213, 1226 (2007) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s reticence to quantify the amount of political power groups are entitled 
to).  
67. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
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Adopting the opt-in approach for tribal governments, however, avoids the 
most glaring concerns about representational legitimacy and DOJ discretion raised 
above. To begin with, tribes are self-governing entities with the sovereign authority 
to represent their members that does not derive from any state or federal law.68 
Instead, tribal governments derive their representational authority from their 
membership, which chooses the tribal government.69 Giving opt-in authority to 
tribal governments would avoid top-down DOJ control over which groups have the 
authority to represent minority voting interests. Further, since tribal governments 
are elected bodies, they are accountable to their membership,70 avoiding the 
concern of having an organization advocate for positions that are at odds with the 
interest group it ostensibly represents.  
Finally, while some critics of the opt-in approach question whether the 
approach would legitimize and entrench divisive racial politics, opt-in for tribes 
avoids this pitfall because tribes are “distinct, independent political 
communities.”71 Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected challenges to tribal 
preference statutes on the basis of invidious racial discrimination because such 
statutes are not racially preferential and are instead designed to further tribal self-
government.72 Accordingly, adopting an opt-in approach for tribal governments, 
while not devoid of potential conflict, is more about the sovereignty of the tribes 
than it is about entrenching racial politics.73  
Amending the VRA to allow tribal governments to opt-in to DOJ review of 
proposed election changes has the practical benefits of keeping the upside of the 
opt-in approach as proposed without the downsides. This is not the end of the 
analysis, though, as tribal opt-in is not only internally consistent with the goals of 
opt-in, but externally consistent with the federal government’s trust responsibilities 
and policy of tribal self-determination. 
  
 
68. E.g. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–65 (1981).  
69. Tribal Constitutions and Voting, YOUR VOTE YOUR VOICE, 
https://www.yourvoteyourvoicemn.org/present/communities/american-indians-present/tribal-
governance-and-voting/tribal-constitutions-and, (last visited June 1, 2020). This is not to say that tribal 
governments are perfect advocates for the interests of every tribal member. Like any community, tribal 
members represent diverse and complex ideological perspectives, which may or not be in accord with 
the policy positions taken by tribal governments. A full discussion on the diversity of democratic 
representation in tribal governments is outside the scope of this paper. 
70. See, e.g., Tribal Governance, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/policy-
issues/tribal-governance (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).  
71. Worcester v. Georgia., 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832). 
72. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974).  
73. This is only to say that the roots of an opt-in amendment to the VRA for tribal governments 
would be primarily aimed at affirming tribal inherent sovereignty, not that non-Native people would gain 
sudden clarity and stop racializing people with indigenous identity in the face of such an amendment. 
For an informative read on the subject see Hilary N. Weaver, Indigenous Identity: What Is It and Who 
Really Has It?, 25 AM. INDIAN Q. 240 (2001). 
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B. Opt-in would be consistent with the federal trust responsibility because it 
defends tribal interests and rights against state and local intrusion 
At its core, the federal trust responsibility is an aspirational concept that the 
federal government must act in the best interests of the tribes, including acting to 
protect tribal property, sovereignty, and political rights.74 The trust responsibility 
has grown, in part, out of the historical mistreatment of the tribes by state and 
federal government.75 The federal government’s special duty of protection under 
the trust responsibility extends both to federal interactions with the tribes and to 
federal protection of the tribes from state interference.76 Indeed, in this context the 
Supreme Court has noted that tribes “owe no allegiance to the states, and receive 
from them no protection[, b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the states . . . 
are often [the tribes’] deadliest enemies.”77 
While the Supreme Court has historically used the trust responsibility to justify 
expansive and paternalistic federal authority over tribes, modern articulations of 
the trust responsibility have shifted (at least rhetorically) towards a conception of 
the trust responsibility as a fiduciary responsibility.78 
In this light, adopting opt-in for tribal governments would be entirely 
consistent with the federal government’s trust responsibility as it is currently 
conceived. Presently, many state laws and election policies threaten Native voting 
rights.79 Opt-in would give tribal governments a powerful bargaining chip in 
negotiation processes and, in the event negotiations fail, literally give the federal 
government the ability to defend tribal members’ political rights from state 
deprivations.  
In addition, to the extent the opt-in approach borrows agency law concepts 
for its structure, opt-in for tribal governments would parallel extant agency law 
 
74. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552 (speaking about the Cherokee’s retention of internal 
sovereignty Chief Justice Marshall said, “The Cherokees acknowledge themselves to be under the 
protection of the United States . . . [but] protection does not imply the destruction of the protected”); 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (noting that the “Indian tribes are wards of the 
nation. They are communities dependent on the United States . . . for their political rights.”). 
75. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.  
76. Id. 
77. Id. However, the “deadliest enemies” model of state-tribal relations has waned over time as 
states and tribal governments are increasingly interacting on a government-to-government basis that 
mirrors that of the federal relationship with tribes. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest 
Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007).  
78. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04(3) (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017) 
[hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. For an in-depth discussion on the evolution of the trust responsibility 
see Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, “We Need Protection from Our Protectors”: The 
Nature, Issues, and Future of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 397 
(2017).  
79. See supra notes 1–9, 49–55 and accompanying text.  
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mandating tribal consultations that is deeply rooted in the trust responsibility.80 A 
host of statutes and executive orders already require consultation with federally 
recognized tribes for agency action that may impact tribal rights or interests.81 Thus, 
adopting the opt-in approach would not be an unprecedented leap, rather it would 
be a small step to extend existing consultation and trust principles (although this 
time with teeth) to the election law field.  
While the trust responsibility informs how the federal government must act 
with respect to tribes, the national policy of tribal self-determination informs how 
the federal government facilitates and respects tribal actions. This policy, which 
values the increasing exercise of sovereign authority by the tribes, is likewise 
consistent with amending the VRA to allow tribal government opt-in.  
C. Opt-in is consistent with the national policy of tribal self-determination because 
it gives power to community interests and knowledge while simultaneously 
providing federal backing to tribal negotiation efforts 
The current national policy towards Indian affairs is one of tribal self-
determination, which is aimed at facilitating tribal exercise of inherent 
sovereignty.82 Coinciding with the civil rights movement, the national policy of self-
determination was precipitated by the resistance efforts of tribal communities to 
what was then the federal policy of terminating tribal recognition.83 By the late 
1960s and into the early 1970s both President Johnson and President Nixon 
articulated a national policy position that would increasingly allow for tribal control 
over tribal affairs with limited federal intervention.84 The policy is encapsulated by 
President Nixon’s statement that self-determination means “that Indians can 
become independent of Federal control without being cut off from Federal concern 
and Federal support.”85 
In accordance with this policy, both Congress and the Executive began to act 
to effectuate greater tribal control over federal programs on reservation as well as 
 
80. See, e.g., Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) (“The 
United States has a unique legal and political relationship with Indian tribal governments, established 
through and confirmed by the Constitution of the United States, treaties, statutes, executive orders, and 
judicial decisions. In recognition of that special relationship . . . executive departments and agencies . . . 
are charged with engaging in regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribal officials 
in the development of Federal policies that have tribal implications, and are responsible for 
strengthening the government-to-government relationship between the United States and Indian 
tribes.”). 
81. See generally White House–Indian Affairs Exec. Working Group, List of Federal Tribal 
Consultation Statutes, Orders, Regulations, Rules, Policies, Manuals, Protocols and Guidance (2009), 
https://projects.ecr.gov/mrbir/pdfs/List%20of%20Fedl%20Tribal%20Consultation%20Statutes%20Ord
ers%20Regs%20Rules.pdf. 
82. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 78, § 1.07.  
83. See, e.g., Mission and History, NAT’L CONGRESS AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/about-
ncai/mission-history (last visited Feb. 26, 2020); see also Duane Champagne, Self-Determination and 
Activism Among American Indians in the United States 1972-1997, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (June 1997), 
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/self-determination-and-
activism-among-american-indians.  
84. See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress on the Problems of the 
American Indian: “The Forgotten American.”, 1 Pub. Papers 335 (Mar. 6, 1968); President Richard M. 
Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, Pub. Papers 564 (July 8, 1970). 
85. Nixon, supra note 844, at 566–67.  
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greater tribal input into activities off reservation that impacted tribal interests or 
rights.86  The growing strength of tribal self-determination and tribal governments 
was accompanied by a familiar backlash from states and nonnative communities 
near reservation boundaries.87 Court battles and actual physical violence typified 
state and local responses to the increased role of tribal governments.88 However, 
in time, some states and local governments have increasingly recognized tribal 
sovereignty and are willing, at least on paper, to engage in government-to-
government relationships with tribes.89 
All this is to say that tribal opt-in would fit nicely into the current paradigm. 
As Prof. Gerken notes, the opt-in approach “privilege[s] local knowledge and 
community involvement” instead of treating minority communities as “passive 
wards of the DOJ” with respect to VRA enforcement.90 This goes hand in hand with 
the national policy of tribal self-determination which explicitly promotes tribal 
solutions to tribal problems with federal backing.91 Opt-in would place a powerful 
bargaining chip in the hands of tribal governments, allowing them to negotiate for 
the plan that best represents tribal interests. However, if the process breaks down 
and the state insists on ignoring tribal input and concerns, then the federal 
government, through the DOJ, can step in to support the tribe through preclearance 
review.92 Finally, tribal-state negotiations and agreements are not a foreign 
concept, so an opt-in approach is not breaking any new ground in terms of how 
tribes are able to relate to state governments. In short, opt-in would bolster tribal 
negotiations with state governments, while simultaneously providing for a federal 
back-stop should negotiations break down.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Native voter suppression is a pressing and often overlooked issue. Historically, 
many state governments prohibited Native suffrage outright, and in the present-
day states and local governments continue to target tribal communities for voter 
suppression efforts. Often these discriminatory policies are small changes that 
exploit the remote and rural nature of many reservations. In a post-Shelby County 
world without effective section 5 preclearance requirements, many of these 
changes evade challenge because of the time and expense of litigation under 
section 2 of the VRA.  
 
86. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 78, § 1.07 (collecting statutes and executive 
orders promulgated pursuant to the national policy of tribal self-determination).  
87. Tassie Hanna, Sam Deloria & Charles E. Trimble, The Commission on State-Tribal Relations: 
Enduring Lessons in the Modern State-Tribal Relationship, 47 TULSA L. REV. 553, 568–71 (2012).  
88. Id.  
89. See Fletcher, supra note 777, at 74.  
90. Gerken, supra note 10, at 727.  
91. Nixon, supra note 84, at 566–67. 
92. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
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In light of this current predicament, adopting VRA opt-in for tribal 
governments would be the right choice. Opt-in is a community-first approach to 
voting right enforcement, placing power in the hands of the tribes to negotiate for 
their policies of choice while still retaining the benefits of federal preclearance 
review. Consistent with both the trust responsibility and the national policy of self-
determination, opt-in is not only a practical method of voting rights enforcement, 
but also a sound choice as a matter of national values. At the end of the day, it is 
fitting that under the opt-in approach the battle to halt Native voter suppression 
would begin with the strengthening of tribal sovereignty.  
